We show that the intuitionistic first-order theory of equality has continuum many complete extensions. We also study the Vitali equivalence relation and show there are many intuitionistically precise versions of it. 1 Classically, all infinite models of the first-order theory of equality are elementarily equivalent. 2 This observation has been made earlier in [10, Section 5]. The first part of the present paper elaborates part of [10, Section 5]. 3 Every spread is a closed subset of N , see Section 4. 4 See Lemma 7. α ∈ X ⊆ N is a decidable point of X if and only if ∀β ∈ X [α = β ∨ ¬(α = β)].
Introduction
We want to contribute to L.E.J. Brouwer's program of doing mathematics intuitionistically.
We follow his advice to interpret the logical constants constructively. A conjunction A ∧ B is considered proven if and only if one has a proof of A and also a proof of B.
A disjunction A ∨ B is considered proven if and only if either A or B is proven. An implication A → B is considered proven if and only if there is a proof of B using the assumption A.
A negation ¬A is considered proven if and only if there is a proof of A → 0 = 1. An existential statement ∃x ∈ V [P (x)] is considered proven if and only an element x 0 is produced together with a proof of the associated statement P (x 0 ).
A universal statement ∀x ∈ V [P (x)] is considered proven if and only if a method is given that produces, given any x in V , a proof of the associated statement P (x).
We also use some axioms proposed by Brouwer: his Continuity Principle, our Axiom 1, a slightly stronger version of it, the First Axiom of Continuous Choice, our Axiom 2, and his Thesis on Bars in N , our Axiom 4.
In some of our proofs, we use an Axiom of Countable Choice, our Axiom 3. Intuitionistic mathematicians, who accept infinite step-by-step constructions not determined by a rule, consider this axiom a reasonable proposal.
Finally, we believe that generalized inductive definitions, like our Definition 24, fall within the compass of intuitionistic mathematics.
Our subject is the (intuitionistic) first-order theory of equality. By considering structures (X , =) where X is a subset of Baire space N = ω ω and = the usual equality relation on N , we find that the theory has an uncountable and therefore astonishing 1 variety of elementarily different infinite models and, as a consequence, an astonishing variety of complete extensions, see Theorem 23. The key observation 2 leading to this result is the recognition that, in a spread 3 , an isolated point is the same as a decidable point. 4 It follows that the set of the non-isolated points of a spread is a definable subset of the spread. In spreads that are transparent 5 , the set of the non-isolated points of the spread coincides with the coherence of the spread 6 , and the coherence itself is spread. It may happen that the coherence of a transparent spread is transparent itself and then the coherence of the coherence also is a definable subset of the spread. And so on.
Any structure (N , R), where R is an equivalence relation on N , is a model of the theory of equality. We study the Vitali equivalence relation, see Section 9, as an example. This equivalence relation, in contrast to the equality relation on N , is not stable 7 , see Theorem 24.
There is a host of binary relations on N that, from a classical point of view, all would be the same as the Vitali equivalence relation, see Sections 10 and 11, and especially Definition 24, Corollary 32 and Definition 27. It turned out to be difficult to find differences between them that are first-order expressible. We did find some such differences, however, by studying structures (N , =, R), where R is an intuitionistic version of the Vitali equivalence relation and = the usual equality, see Section 12.
The paper is divided into 13 Sections and consists roughly of two parts. Sections 2-8 lead up to the result that the theory of equality has continuum many complete extensions, see Theorem 23. Sections 9-12 treat the Vitali equivalence relations. Section 13 lists some notations and conventions and may be used by the reader as a reference.
Intuitionistic model theory
Given a relational structure A = (A, R 0 , R 1 , . . . , R n−1 ), we construct a firstorder language L with basic formulas R i (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x li−1 ), where i < n and l i is the arity of R i . The formulas of L are obtained from the basic formulas by using ∧, ∨, →, ¬, ∃, ∀ in the usual way.
For every formula ϕ = ϕ(x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m−1 ) of L, for all a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m−1 in A, we define the statement:
A |= ϕ[a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m−1 ] (A realizes ϕ if x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m−1 are interpreted by a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m−1 , respectively), as Tarski did it, with the proviso that connectives and quantifiers are interpreted intuitionistically.
A formula ϕ of L without free variables will be called a sentence.
A theory (in L) is a set of sentences of L. Given a theory Γ in L and a structure A, we define: A realizes Γ if and only if, for every ϕ in Γ, A |= ϕ.
Given a structure B that has the same signature as A, so that the formulas of L may be interpreted in B as well as in A, we let T h(B), the theory of B, be the set of all sentences ϕ of L such that B |= ϕ.
A theory Γ in L will be called a complete theory if and only if there exists a structure B such that Γ = T h(B).
This agrees with one of the uses of the expression 'complete theory' in classical, that is: usual, non-intuitionistic, model theory, see [4, p. 43 ]. Note that one may be unable to decide, for a given sentence ϕ and a given structure B, whether or not B |= ϕ. Intuitionistically, it is not true that, for every complete theory Γ and every sentence ϕ, either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ. 5 see Definition 8. 6 The coherence of a closed set is the set of its limit points, see Definition 7. 7 Complete theories Γ, ∆ are positively different if one may point out a sentence ψ such that ψ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆. 8 Structures Let Γ be a theory in L. A good question is the following: How many complete theories ∆ can one find extending Γ? We will say: Γ admits countably many complete extensions if and only if there exists an infinite sequence ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 , . . . of complete theories extending Γ such that, for all m, n, if m = n, then ∆ m , ∆ n are (positively) different, and Γ admits continuum many complete extensions if and only if there exists a function α → ∆ α associating to every element α of C = 2 ω a complete theory extending Γ such that for all α, β, if 9 α # β, then ∆ α , ∆ β are (positively) different.
A main result of this paper is that the first-order theory of equality admits continuum many complete extensions.
Equality may be undecidable
The first-order theory EQ of equality consists of the following three axioms:
(
A model of EQ is a structure of the form (V, R), where V is a set and R is an equivalence relation on V , possibly, but not necessarily, the equality relation belonging to V .
Classically, every complete extension of EQ is realized in one of the structures from the list: ({0}, =), ({0, 1}, =), ({0, 1, 2}, =), . . . and (ω, =). This shows that, classically, EQ admits of (no more than) countably many complete extensions.
Intuitionistically, however, we have to observe that all structures on this list satisfy the sentence ∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)], that is: the equality relation, on each of these sets, is a decidable relation.
It is well-known, however, that the equality relation on the set N is not a decidable relation. Let us recall why.
If we define an element α of N by stipulating:
where d : N → {0, 1, . . . , 9} is the decimal expansion of π, we are unable to decide: α = 0 ∨ ¬(α = 0). This is because, if α = 0, then ¬∃n∀i < 99[α(n + i) = 9], and, if ¬(α = 0), then ¬¬∃n∀i < 99[d(n + i) = 9], and we have no proof of either alternative.
This example shows us that the statement ∀α[α = 0 ∨ ¬(α = 0)], for a constructive mathematician, who interprets the disjunction strongly, is a reckless statement. 10 The following axiom, used by Brouwer 11 , implies that the statement ∀α[α = 0 ∨ ¬(α = 0)] even leads to a contradiction. 8 If ψ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆, then ¬ψ ∈ ∆ and ¬¬ψ ∈ Γ: the relation positively different is symmetric.
, see Section 13. 10 A statement is reckless if one might think it is true while the intuitionistic mathematician understands there is no proof for his constructive reading of it. 11 see [10] .
Axiom 1 (Brouwer's Continuity Principle) .
An immediate consequence is:
Proof. Define R := {(α, n) | α ∈ P n ] and apply Axiom 1.
Proof. (i) Let α be given and assume:
Consider β := αm * α(m) + 1 * 0 (for the first alternative) and β := α (for the second one) and conclude that both alternatives are false.
(ii) This is an immediate consequence of (i).
Definition 1.
For each n, we let ψ n be the sentence
ψ n expresses that a set has at least n + 1 elements. Note that, in classical mathematics, T inf has only one complete extension. Intuitionistically, however, T inf has (at least) two positively different complete extensions, T h (N , =) and T h (ω, =) .
The next Theorem reflects the fact that, in classical model theory, all models of T inf are elementarily equivalent. Proof. For each n, consider the first n variables of our language: x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 . A formula ε = ε(x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) is called an equality type if and only if it is of the form i<j<n σ ij where each σ ij either is the formula x i = x j or the formula ¬(x i = x j ). 12 One may prove: for all structures
The proof is by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ.
It follows that any two models
From here on, we restrict attention to infinite models of EQ, that is, to models of T inf . The hackneyed question to make a survey of models that are finite, or at least not infinite, and of models for which one can not decide if they are finite or infinite, is left for another occasion. That the job is not an easy one will be clear to readers of [8] . For every β, we define:
Spreads
If Spr(β) and β( ) = 0, then F β = ∅.
If Spr(β) and β( ) = 0, then F β is inhabited 13 . One may define α such that ∀n[α(n) = µp[β(αn * p ) = 0]] and observe: ∀n[β(αn) = 0], that is: α ∈ F β .
Is every closed set a spread?
For this β, the statement 'F β is a spread' thus turns out to be reckless. Brouwer's Continuity Principle enables one to obtain a stronger conclusion.
Both alternatives are false, as we see by considering β = 0m * 1 (for the first alternative), and β = 0 (for the second one).
The following theorem reformulates a well-known fact.
Theorem 6 (Apartness is definable). For all β such that Spr(β),
Proof. First, assume α # δ. Find n such that αn = δn. Note: for every γ in F β , either : γn = αn and γ # α, or : γn = δn and γ # δ. Conclude:
The first alternative is clearly wrong (take γ := α). The second alternative implies: αm ⊥ δ (if αm ⊏ δ, one could take γ := δ), and thus: α # δ.
Definition 4.
For each n, we let ψ + n be the sentence ∃x 0 ∃x
n expresses that a set has at least n + 1 elements that are mutually apart. Every model of T + inf realizes T inf . In the second part of the paper we will meet a structure that realizes T inf but not T + inf , see Theorem 25 in Section 9. The theory T + inf ∪{∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)]} has only one complete extension, the same as the one and only complete extension of T inf ∪ {∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)]}, see Theorem 3. I(F β ) is the set of the isolated points of F β .
Spreads with a decidable equality
Cantor called I(F β ) the adherence of F β .
Lemma 7. Assume Spr(β).
Note: for each γ in F β , either αn ⊏ γ and α = γ, or αn ⊥ γ and α = γ.
Apply Lemma 5 and find m such that either ∀γ ∈
As the second alternative does not hold (take γ = α), conclude: ∀γ ∈ F β [αm ⊏ γ → α = γ], and: α is an isolated point of F β .
(ii) Using (i), note: L(F β ) is the set of the limit points of F β .
Cantor called L(F β ) the coherence of F β .
, that is: in all spreads, every limit point is a non-isolated point.
Proof. Obvious.
Theorem 9. The following are equivalent:
, that is: in all spreads, every non-isolated point is a limit point.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let β be given such that Spr(β). Assume α is not an isolated point of F β , that is: We thus see that the converse of Lemma 8, being equivalent to Markov's Principle, is not an intuitionistic theorem.
We could not answer the question if, in general, L(F β ) is a definable subset of (F β , =). In some special cases, however, it is, and the following definition is useful.
Note that, for each β such that Spr(β), if F β is transparent, then F β \ I(F β ) ⊆ L(F β ). The statement that every spread F β is transparent thus is seen to imply Markov's Principle.
In Section 7 we will see many examples of transparent spreads. The fact that not every spread is a transparent spread is one of the reasons that Brouwer did not succeed in finding a nice intuitionistic version of Cantor's Main Theorem 15 , see [1] . Definition 9. Let β satisfy Spr(β) and let ϕ be given.
We define:
We define: ϕ is an injective map from F β into ω, notation: ϕ :
If ϕ : F β → N , then we define, for each α in F β , ϕ|α as the element δ of N such that ∀n[δ(n) = ϕ n (α)]. 15 Cantor's Main Theorem nowadays is called the Perfect Set Theorem: every closed subset of N is the union of a perfect set and an at most countable set.
We define: ϕ is an injective map from F β into N , notation: ϕ :
For every X ⊆ N , F β embeds into X if and only if there exists an injective map from F β into X .
The following axiom is, at least at first sight, a little bit stronger than Brouwer's Continuity Principle.
Lemma 10 (The First Axiom of Continuous Choice extends to spreads). Let β be given such that Spr(β). Then, for all
Proof. Assume: Spr(β) and β( ) = 0. As in the proof of Lemma 5, define ρ :
Proof. Assume F β is enumerable and β( ) = 0. Find δ such that ∀n[δ n ∈ F β ] and ∀α ∈ F β ∃n[α = δ n ]. Using Lemma 10, find ϕ :
We make a preliminary observation. Let s, n be given such that β(s) = 0 and ϕ(s) = n + 1 and Proof. Use Theorem 11 and Lemma 12.
Spreads with exactly one undecidable point
Definition 11. We let τ 2 be the element of C satisfying:
Note: τ 2 is a spread-law and T 2 is a spread. Let us take a closer look at
For each n, we define n * := 0n * 1.
The infinite sequence 0, 0 * , 1 * , 2 * , . . . is a list of elements of T 2 and a classical mathematician might think it is the list of all elements of T 2 . The intuitionistic mathematician knows better. He defines α in T 2 such that
where d : N → {0, 1, . . . , 9} is the decimal expansion of π. As yet, one has no proof of the statement 'α = 0', as this statement implies: ∀k∃i < 99]d(k + i) = 9] . As yet, one also has no proof of the statement: '∃n[α = n * ]' as this statement implies: ∃n∀i < 99[d(n + i) = 9]. The statement that α occurs in the above list is a reckless one.
For each n, n * is an isolated and a decidable point of T 2 , and 0 is a non-isolated and an undecidable point of T 2 . It follows, by Lemma 7 and Corollary 13, that T 2 is not an enumerable spread. In particular, the statement that the list 0, 0 * , 1 * , 2 * , . . . is a complete list of the elements of T 2 , leads to a contradiction, as appears again from the following Theorem.
(ii) Let α in T 2 be given such that α # 0. Define n := µm[α(m + 1) ⊥ 0]. Note: α(n + 1) = 0n * 1 and α = n * .
This definition deserves some explanation. If F β is almost-enumerable and inhabited, we are able to come forward with an infinite sequence δ 0 , δ 1 , . . . of elements of F β such that, for every α in F β , every attempt ε to prove that α is apart from all elements of the infinite sequence δ 0 , δ 1 , . . ., (ε expresses the guess: ∀n[αε(n) ⊥ δ n ε(n)]), will positively fail.
Almost-enumerable spreads are studied in [13, Section 9] , where they are called almost-countable located and closed subsets of N .
Proof. Define δ such that δ 0 = 0 and, for each n. δ n+1 = n * = 0n * 1. Note: ∀n[δ n ∈ T 2 ]. Let ε be given. If αε(0) = δ 0 ε(0), we are done. If not, then α ⊥ 0 and we may determine n such that α = δ n+1 and αε(n + 1) = δ n+1 ε(n + 1).
Proof. (i) 0 is not an isolated point of T 2 , and, therefore, not a decidable point of T 2 . Also, by Theorem 14 (ii) , ∀α ∈ T 2 [α # 0 → ∃n[α = n * ]], and, for each n, for each α in T 2 , α = n * ↔ 0n * 1 ⊏ α, so one may decide: α = n * or ¬(α = n * ), and: n * is a decidable point of T 2 . We thus see:
Note: for each s such that β(s) = 0, the set F β ∩ s := {δ ∈ F β | s ⊏ δ} is a spread, and, if s ⊥ α, then F β ∩ s consists of isolated points of F β ∩ s only, and thus, by Theorem 11, embeds into ω.
Using Axiom 3, we find ϕ such that, for each s, if β(s) = 0 and there exist n, i such that s = αn * i and i = α(n), then ϕ s : F β ∩ s ֒→ ω.
We now define ψ : F β → T 2 such that ψ|α = 0 and, for each
7. More and more undecidable points: the toy spreads Definition 13. For each n, we let τ n be the element of C satisfying:
We also define: T n := F τn .
For each n, τ n is a spread-law and T n and
In this paper, the spreads T 0 , T 1 , . . . will be called the toy spreads. Note that, for each n, for each s, if s = and τ n (s) = 0, then s † ∈ T n .
Theorem 17. For each n > 0, T n is almost-enumerable.
Proof. Let n > 0 be given. Define δ such that, for each s, if s = and τ n (s) = 0, then δ s = s † , and if not, then δ s = 0.
We claim: ∀α ∈ T n ∀ε∃s[αε(s) = δ s ε(s)]. We establish this claim by proving, for each k < n,
, and we do so by backwards induction, starting with the case k = n − 1.
The case k = n − 1 is treated as follows. If ∃i[α(i) = n − 1], find i 0 := µi[α(i) = n − 1] and consider s := α(i 0 + 1). Note: α = s † = δ s and, therefore, for every ε: αε(s) = δ s ε(s).
We have to prove:
Let α be given such that ∃i[α(i) = k]. Let also ε be given.
and define s := α(i 0 + 1). There are two cases to consider.
Using the induction hypothesis, we conclude: ∃s[αε(s) = δ s ε(s)].
Theorem 18.
Proof. The proof uses Lemma 7 and is left to the reader.
Definition 15. We define an infinite sequence D 0 , D 1 , . . . of formulas, as follows.
and, more generally for each m > 0,
We also define, for each m > 0, sentences ψ m and ρ m , as follows:
For each m, α is a limit point of order m + 1 of F β if and only if, for each p, there exists a limit point γ of order m such that αp ⊏ γ and α ⊥ γ.
Assume n > 0 and α ∈ T n . Note the following: Definition 17. Assume Spr(β), Spr(γ).
Note that F β ⊎ F γ , m ⊗ F β and ω ⊗ F β are spreads again. We also define, for all m, n > 0, sentences ψ n m and ρ n m , as follows:
The sentence ψ n m expresses: 'there exist (at least) n limit points of order m that are mutually apart '.
The sentence ρ n m expresses: 'there exist exactly n limit points of order m that are mutually apart '. If p + 1 < m and n > 0, then T m and also n ⊗ T m contain infinitely many limit points of order p that are mutually apart.
If p + 1 = m and n > 0, then n ⊗ T m contains exactly n limit points of order p that are mutually apart: the points i * 0, where i < n, so (n ⊗ T m , =) |= ψ q p if and only if q ≤ n.
If p < m, then ω × T m contains infinitely many limit points of order p that are mutually apart.
The proofs of (i), (ii) and (iii) follow easily from these observations.
Definition 18.
For each k, for each s in ω k , we define:
For each α, we define:
Definition 19. Let F 0 , F 1 ⊆ N and assume ϕ :
F 0 is equivalent to F 1 , notation: F 0 ∼ F 1 , if and only if there exists ϕ : F 0 → F 1 that is both injective 17 and surjective.
(ii) For all m, n, if m < n, then T m ⊕ T n ∼ T n .
(iii) For all k, for all s in ω k , there exist m, n such that T s ∼ n ⊗ T m .
Proof. (i) Let m be given. Define ϕ : T m ⊕ T m+1 → T m+1 such that, for all δ in T m , ϕ| 0 * δ = 1 * S • δ, and, for each δ in T m+1 , ϕ| 1 * δ = 0 * δ. Clearly, ϕ is a one-to-one function mapping T m ⊕ T m+1 onto T m+1 .
(ii) Let m be given. We use induction on n. The case n = m + 1 has been treated in (i) . Now let n be given such that m < n and T m ⊕ T n ∼ T n . Then
(iii) We use induction on k. If s ∈ ω 0 , then s = and ∅ = T s = 0 ⊗ T 1 . Now let k be given such that for all s in ω k there exist m, n such that T s = n⊗T m . Let s = t * p in ω k+1 be given. Find m, n such that T t = n ⊗ T m . Note: T s ∼ T t ⊕ T p and consider several cases.
Case (1): t = . Then T s = 1 ⊗ T p .
Case (2): t = and p < m. Then, by (ii) : (3): t = and p = m. Then: (4): t = and p > m. Then, by (ii):
Theorem 23 (EQ has continuum many complete extensions 18 ). Note that the toy spreads T 0 , T 1 , . . . are fans. The set T α , however, is a spread but, in general, not a fan.
Define, for each α, T * α := n 0n * 1 * T α(n) . 19 Note that, for each α, T * α is a fan. One may prove a statement very similar to Theorem 23(iv):
For all ζ, η in [ω] ω , if ζ ⊥ η and ζ(0) = η(0) = 2, then there exists a sentence ψ such that (T * ζ , =) |= ψ and (T * η , =) |= ¬ψ.
8.3.
Comparison with an older theorem. The first-order theory DLO of dense linear orderings without endpoints is formulated in a first-order language with binary predicate symbols = and ⊏ and consists of the following axioms: 
In [6, Theorem 2.4] one constructs a function α → A α associating to each element α of 2 ω = C a subset A α of the set R of the real numbers such that, for each α in C, A α is dense in (R, < R ), and, for all α, β in C, if α ⊥ β, then there exists a sentence ψ such that (A α , < R ) |= ψ and (A β , < R ) |= ¬ψ.
Note: each structure (A α , < R ) realizes DLO. The (intuitionistic) theory DLO thus has continuum many complete extensions. 20 Theorem 23(iii) strengthens this result.
One may obtain the result of 23(iii) with subsets of R as well as with subsets of N . Define an infinite sequence U 0 , U 1 , . . . of subsets of R by:
U 0 := ∅ and U 1 := {0 R }, and for each m > 0, U m+1 = n
For each m, one may define ϕ : T m → U m such that ϕ is surjective and satisfies:
It follows that, for each m, the structures (T m , =) and (U m , = R ) are elementarily equivalent.
Define, for each α in [ω] ω , A α := n n + R U α(n) . Note: for all α, β in [ω] ω , if α ⊥ β, then there exists a sentence ψ such that (A α , = R ) |= ψ and (A β , = R ) |= ¬ψ.
We thus obtain from Theorem 23 a result similar to [6, Theorem 2.4] , this time using not the ordering relation < R but only the equality relation = R .
Note that the relation = R is definable in the structure (R, < R ) as
The Vitali equivalence relation
For all α, β, we define
The relation ∼ V will be called the Vitali equivalence relation. This is because the relation ∼ V on N resembles the relation ∼ Q on the set R of the real numbers defined by:
The relation ∼ Q has played an important rôle in classical set theory. If one constructs, using the axiom of choice, within the interval [0, 1], a transversal for this equivalence relation, that is: a complete set of mutually inequivalent representatives, one obtains a set that is not Lebesgue measurable. This discovery is due to G. Vitali. 20 Classically, T h (Q, <) is the one and only complete extension of DLO. 21 For each X ⊆ R, X := {x ∈ R | ∀n∃y ∈ X [|x − y| < 1 2 n ]} is the closure of X .
Note: (N , ∼ V ) |= EQ.
The following theorem brings to light an important difference between (N , =) and (N , ∼ V ). Theorem 24 (Equality is stable but the Vitali equivalence relation is not stable). (i) 
Proof. (i) Note: for all α, β, α = β ↔ ¬(α # β), and, therefore:
F γ is the set of all α that differ at at most one place from γ. Note that F γ is a spread. We have two claims.
The proof is as follows. Let α in F γ be given. Distinguish two cases.
Case (1) . ∃n[α(n) = γ(n)]. Find n such that α(n) = γ(n) and conclude: ∀m > n[α(m) = γ(m)] and α ∼ V γ.
Case (2) . ¬∃n[α(n) = γ(n)]. Conclude: ∀n[α(n) = γ(n)] and α ∼ V γ.
We thus see: if ∃n[α(n) = γ(n)] ∨ ¬∃n[α(n) = γ(n)], then α ∼ V γ.
As ¬¬(∃n[α(n) = γ(n)] ∨ ¬∃n[α(n) = γ(n)]), also ¬¬(α ∼ V γ). Combining our two claims, we see:
It follows from Theorem 24 that there is no relation # V on N satisfying the requirements of an apartness relation 23 with respect to ∼ V :
The existence of an apartness # V would imply, by the first one of these requirements, that ∼ V is a stable relation, as, for any proposition P , ¬¬¬P ↔ ¬P .
The next Theorem now is no surprise:
22 The term 'stable' has been introduced by D. Van Dantzig, who hoped to be able to reconstruct 'classical', non-intuitionistic mathematics within the stable part of intuitionistic mathematics, see [3] . 23 See [5, p. 256] Proof. Let α, β be given.
The first of these two alternatives is wrong,
We thus see:
Clearly, the relation defined by the formula AP in the structure (N , ∼ V ) fails to satisfy the first requirement for an apartness relation with respect to ∼ V .
It follows from Theorem 25 that (N , ∼ V ), while realizing T inf , does not realize T + inf , see Definitions 1 and 4.
A first Vitali variation
There are many intuitionistic versions of the classical Vitali equivalence relation. This is obvious to someone who knows that there are many variations upon the notion of a finite and decidable subset of N, see [8] and [11, Section 3] .
V is an equivalence relation on N . Proof. (i) One proves this easily by induction.
(ii) Obvious.
(iii) Let γ be given.
consists of all α that assume at most i times a value different from the value assumed by γ. In particular, F 0 γ = {γ}. Note: for all i, m, α, β, if m = µn[α(n) = γ(n)] and α = α(m + 1) * β, then α ∈ F γ i+1 ↔ β ∈ F γ i . We have two claims.
. We prove this claim by induction. The starting point of the induction is the observation:
Assume α ∈ F γ i+1 and ∃n[α(n) = γ(n)]. Find n such that α(n) = γ(n). Find β such that α = α(n+1) * β, and note: β ∈ F γ i and thus, by the induction hypothesis,
. This completes the proof of the induction step.
. We again use induction. We first prove:
Define m := max(n + 1, p) and define α such that ∀n[α(n) = γ(n) ↔ n = m]. Note: α ∈ F 1 and γp ⊏ α and α(m) = γ(m) and m > n. Contradiction.
Define m := max(n + 1, p). Let β in F γ i+1 be given. Define α such that m = µn[α(n) = γ(n)] and ∀n > m[α(n) = β(n)]. Note: α ∈ F γ i+2 and α(m) = γ(m) and m > n, so α ∼ i V γ, and, therefore, by (i) 
and, by the induction hypothesis, obtain a contradiction.
This completes the proof of the induction step.
Taking our first and second claim together, we obtain the conclusion:
We use induction on i + j and distinguish four cases.
Case (1) We thus see: Assume m > q and α(m) = γ(m). Then either: α(m) = β(m) and α ∼ i−1 β, and, by the induction hypothesis, α ∼ i+j−1 V γ, or: β(m) = γ(m) and β ∼ j−1 γ and, by the induction hypothesis, α ∼ i+j−1 γ.
(v) is an easy consequence of (iv).
The next Theorem shows that the structures (N , ∼ V ) and (N , ∼ ω V ) have a property in common.
Proof. Let γ be given.
We repeat a definition we gave in the proof of Theorem 26(iii).
In the proof of Theorem 26(iii), we saw:
The argument is as follows. Let α in F γ ω be given and distinguish two cases.
. In order to see this, assume:
. Define q := max(p, i + 1). Let α in F γ q be given. Define β such that ∀n < q[β(n) = γ(n)] and β(q) = γ(q) and ∀n > q[β(n) = α(n)].
Note: β ∈ F q+1 and q = µn[β(n) = γ(n)], and, therefore, β ∈ F γ ω . As γq ⊏ β, we conclude:
As q > i, this contradicts the Second claim in the proof of Theorem 26(iii). Taking our two claims together, we conclude:
. We did not succeed in finding a sentence ψ such that (N , ∼ V ) |= ψ and (N , ∼ ω V ) |= ¬ψ.
More and more Vitali relations
In [8] , [9] and [11, Section 3] , one studies the set For each i, the set {α | α ∼ i V 0} is called, in [9] and [11] , the i-th perhapsive extension of the set Fin. It is shown, in [8] , [9] and [11] , that the process of building perhapsive extensions of Fin can be carried on into the transfinite.
In a similar way, the Vitali equivalence relation ∼ V admits of transfinitely many extensions.
The relation ∼ ω V is only a first extension of ∼ V . Let us consider a second one.
We also define:
One may prove analogues of Theorems 26 and 27 and conclude: ∼ ω+ω V is an equivalence relation on N , properly extending ∼ ω V , that, like ∼ V and ∼ ω V , is not stable in the sense of Theorem 27. One may continue and define ∼ ω+ω+ω V , and ∼ ω+ω+ω+ω V and so on. The process of building such extensions leads further into the transfinite, as follows.
Definition 24. Let R be binary relation on N .
We define a binary relation R + on N by:
We let E be the least class of binary relations on N such that (i) the Vitali equivalence relation ∼ V belongs to E, and, (ii) for every R in E, also R + ∈ E, and, (iii) for every infinite sequence R 0 , R 1 , . . . of elements of E, also i R i ∈ E.
The elements of E are the extensions of the Vitali equivalence relation.
Note that < ω V and < ω+ω V are in E. In general, a relation R in E is not transitive. One may prove, for instance, that the relation < 1 V , while belonging to E, is not transitive. The next Theorem shows that E contains many transitive relations.
Theorem 28 (E contains many transitive relations). (i) ∼ V is transitive.
(ii) Given any transitive R in E, there exists a transitive T in E such that R + ⊆ T .
(iii) Given any infinite and increasing sequence R 0 ⊆ R 1 ⊆ . . . of transitive relations in E, also i R i is a transitive relation in E.
Proof. (i) Obvious. (ii) We take our inspiration from Theorem 26 (iv) and (v). Let a transitive R in E be given. Define an infinite sequence R 0 , R 1 , . . . of elements of E such that R 0 = R and, for each i, R i+1 = (R i ) + .
One may prove: for all i, for all j, ∀α∀β∀γ[(αR i β ∧ βR i γ) → αR i+j γ], as it is done for the special case R =∼ V in the proof of Theorem 26(iv).
Define T := i R i and note: T ∈ E, R + ⊆ T and T is transitive. (iii) Note: for every increasing sequence R 0 ⊆ R 1 ⊆ . . . of transitive relations on N , also i R i is transitive.
Theorem 28 will gain significance after Corollary 32, which shows that, for every R in E, R ⊆ R + and ¬(R + ⊆ R).
We did not succeed in proving that every R in E extends to a transitive T in E. Lemma 29. Every R in E is shift-invariant.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward exercise in induction on E. Note:
Definition 26. We let E * be the least class of binary relations on N such that (i) the Vitali equivalence relation ∼ V belongs to E * , and (ii) for every infinite sequence R 0 , R 1 , . . . of elements of E * , also
Lemma 30. E * ⊆ E and, for all R in E, there exists T in E * such that R ⊆ T .
Proof. The proofs of the two statements are straightforward, by induction on E * and E, respectively.
Theorem 31. For each R in E * , R ⊆ R + and ¬(R + ⊆ R).
Proof. For each R in E, we define F in R := {α | αR0}. 24 We prove for each R in E * there exists a fan F such that F ⊆ F in R + and ¬(F ⊆ F in R ).
We do so by induction on E * .
Now assume F ⊆ F in ∼V , that is: ∀α ∈ F ∃n∀m > n[α(m) = 0]. Using Lemma 5, find p, n such that ∀α ∈ F [0p ⊏ α → ∀m > n[α(m) = 0]]. Define q := max(p, n + 1) and consider α := 0q * 1 * 0. Contradiction.
Conclude: ¬(F ⊆ F in ∼V ).
(II) Let R 0 , R 1 , . . . be an infinite sequence of elements of E. Let F 0 , F 1 , . . . be an infinite sequence of fans such that, for each n, F n ⊆ F in (Rn) + and ¬(F n ⊆ F in Rn ).
Consider R :
Note that F is a fan. We now prove: F ⊆ F in R + and ¬(F ⊆ F in R ). Note that, for each α ∈ F , for each n, if n = µi[α(i) = 0], then there exists β in F n ′ such that α = α(n + 1) * β.
As, for each n,
Define q := max(p, n + 1) and note:
Using Lemma 5 again, find r, i such that ∀α ∈ F [0q * 1 * 0r ⊏ α → α ∈ F i ]. Find n ≥ q + r + 1 such that n ′ = i and define t := n − (q + 1).
24 In [8] , X ⊆ N is called a notion of finiteness if Fin ⊆ X ⊆ Fin ¬¬ . For every R in E, F in R is a notion a finiteness. 25 For each n, n = (n ′ , n ′′ ), see Section 13.
Note: t ≥ r and conclude: ∀β 
α ∼ almost V β if and only if the set {n | α(n) = β(n)} is almost * -finite in the sense used in [11, Section 0.8.2] .
The following axiom is a form of Brouwer's famous Thesis on bars in N , see [12] . 
is an equivalence relation. One needs the fact that, for all propositions P, Q, (¬¬P ∧ ¬¬Q) → ¬¬(P ∧ Q).
We prove that ∼ almost V is a transitive relation. Let α, β, γ be given such that α ∼ almost
The proof is by (transfinite) induction on E. We only prove: for all R in E, R ⊆ ∼ ¬¬ V as the statement: for all R in E, ∼ V ⊆ R is very easy to prove. (I) Our starting point is the trivial observation:
We have to prove: ∀α∀β[αR + β → ¬¬(α ∼ V β)]. We do so as follows. Let α, β be given such that αR + β. Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) = β(m) → αRβ] and consider two special cases.
Case (1): ∃m > n[α(m) = β(m). Then αR β, and, therefore: ¬¬(α ∼ V β).
Case (2): ¬∃m > n[α(m) = β(m). Then ∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)] and α ∼ V β.
In both cases, we find: ¬¬(α ∼ V β). 
. We prove this as follows:
Let α, β be given such that
We do so as follows. Let α, β be given such that αR + β. Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) = β(m) → αRβ]. Let ζ in [ω] ω be given. Consider ζ(n + 1) and note ζ(n + 1) > n. There now are two cases.
Either α • ζ(n + 1) = β • ζ(n + 1) or α • ζ(n + 1) = β • ζ(n + 1).
In the first case we are done, and in the second case we conclude αRβ, and, using the induction hypothesis, find p such that α • ζ(p) = β • ζ(p).
In both cases we conclude:
We thus see: 
Find a sequence 27 R 0 , R 1 , . . . of elements of E such that, for each n, if s * n ∈ [ω] ω and α(n) = β(n), then αR n β.
Define R := ( i R i ) + and note: R ∈ E.
We thus see ∀ζ 
Equality and equivalence
We did not succeed in finding a sentence ψ such that (N , ∼ V ) |= ψ and (N , ∼ ω V ) |= ¬ψ. We now want to compare the structures (N , =, ∼ V ) and (N , =, ∼ ω V ). We need a first order language with two binary relation symbols: = and ∼. The symbol = will denote the equality relation and the symbol ∼ will denote, in the first structure, the relation ∼ V and, in the second structure, the relation ∼ ω V . The reader hopefully will not be confused by the fact that, in the earlier sections, where we used the first order language with a single binary relation symbol, =, the symbol = denoted the relations ∼ V and ∼ ω V . The next Theorem makes us see that equality is decidable on each equivalence class of ∼ V whereas, on each equivalence class of ∼ ω V , it is not decidable. Theorem 36. Note: γ # δ → αRβ, and, as R is shift-invariant, also: γ # δ → γRδ, and, therefore: γRδ, and also: αRβ.
We thus see: R + ⊆ R. Proof. Use Lemmas 37 and 38 and Corollary 32.
Notations and conventions
We use m, n, . . . as variables over the set ω = N of the natural numbers. For every P ⊆ N such that ∀n[P (n) ∨ ¬P (n)], for all m, m = µn[P (n)] ↔ P (m) ∧ ∀n < m[¬P (n)] . (m, n) → J(m, n) is a one-to-one surjective mapping from ω × ω onto ω. K, L : ω × ω are its inverse functions, so ∀n[J K(n), L(n) = n]. For each n, n ′ := K(n) and n ′′ := L(n). (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 ) → n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 is a one-to-one surjective mapping from the set of finite sequences of natural numbers to the set of the natural numbers. n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 is the code of the finite sequence (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 ). s → length(s) is is the function that, for each s, gives the length of the finite sequence coded by s. s, n → s(n) is the function that, for all s, n, gives the value of the finite sequence coded by s at n. If n ≥ length(s), then s(n) = 0.
For all s, k, if length(s) = k, then s = s(0), s(1), . . . s(k − 1) . 0 = codes the empty sequence of natural numbers, the unique finite sequence s such that length(s) = 0.
ω k := {s | length(s) = k}.
30 Following the terminology in [8] , a binary relation R on N should be called perhapsive if R + ⊆ R.
[ω] k := {s ∈ ω k | ∀i[i + 1 < k → s(i) < s(i + 1)]}.
[ω] <ω := k [ω] k . For all s, k, t, l, if s ∈ ω k and t ∈ ω l , then s * t is the element u of ω k+l such that ∀i < k[u(i) = s(i)] and ∀j < l[u(k + j) = t(j)].
s ⊑ t ↔ ∃u[s * u = t]. s ⊏ t ↔ (s ⊑ t ∧ s = t).
We use α, β, . . . as variables over Baire space, the set ω ω := N of functions from N to N.
(α, n) → α(n) is the function that associates to all α, n, the value of α at n. For all α, β, α • β is the element γ of N such that ∀n[γ(n) = α β(n) ]. [ω] ω := {ζ ∈ N | ∀i[ζ(i) < ζ(i + 1)]}. Q, the set of the rationals, may be defined as a subset of ω, with accompanying relations = Q , < Q , ≤ Q and operations + Q , − Q , · Q .
R := {α | ∀n[α ′ (n) ∈ Q ∧ α ′′ (n) ∈ Q] ∧ ∀n[α ′ (n) ≤ Q α ′ (n + 1) ≤ Q α ′′ (n + 1) ≤ Q α ′′ (n)] ∧ ∀m∃n[α ′′ (n) − Q α ′ (n) < Q 1 2 m ]}. For all α, β in R, α < R β ↔ ∃n[α ′′ (n) < Q β ′ (n)] and α = R β ↔ ¬(α < R β) ∧ ¬(β < R α) . Operations + R , − R are defined straightforwardly.
